The action of
the Chief Justice raised a question which we think was wisely determined by the Senate. As
President of the Court of Impeachment Judge Chase made a ruling which was questioned by
Senator Drake, of Missouri, upon the ground that as President he had no right to decide
any but ceremonial questions, and that every thing affecting the trial must be referred to
the decision of the Senate. The Chief Justice was sustained, and when the question was
again raised by Senator Sumner it was again settled in the same manner. The conclusion was
that the Chief Justice may decide any preliminary point subject, of course, to revision by
the Senate upon the appeal of any Senator.
The case against the position of the
Chief Justice was stated very forcibly by Mr. Boutwell, of the Managers. He urged that the
Constitution makes the Senate the sole Court of Impeachment, and that the Chief Justice,
not being a Senator, could have no voice. If he could, he might by a casting vote decide
adversely to the judgment of the Senate by voting affirmatively upon a tie. The
Constitution, in making him President of the Court, did not make him a member of it. Mr.
Boutwell, with all the Senators who differed from the Chief Justice, was very careful to
express his perfect confidence in that high officer. But he said that the Senate was now
making precedents, and must regard every question with strict impersonality.
But the conclusive consideration seems to
us to be, that in making the Chief Justice President of the Senate for a particular
purpose, the Constitution did not mean that he should be a mere figure-head, but that, at
least, he should have the ordinary powers of a presiding officer. It is not conceivable
that the Constitution would bring one of the most dignified officers in the Government,
the head of one of its three great departments, into the Senate of the United States upon
so imposing and solemn an occasion as the impeachment, and possible removal, of the
Executive head of the Government, as a mere cipher, a ceremony, a pageant. The
Constitution, which makes the Senate the sole Court to try impeachment, also appoints the
Chief Justice for that occasion its Presidentfor that august occasion it were, an ex-officio
member. His presence and participation secure the attendance of two of the departments of
the Government at the trial of the third; and he alone is selected from the Bench, as its
chief, as a matter of convenience, and in recognition of the manifest propriety that the
Judiciary should be represented.
It is very desirable that this
interpretation should now be settled, that there may be no doubt hereafter. Undoubtedly it
is a debatable question. The Constitution does not expressly define the duties of the
Chief Justice as President. The Senate should therefore give to the intention of the
Constitution the most generous construction. Is it desirable for any reason whatever that
the Chief Justice presiding should be merely a cipher? Is any peril reasonably to be
feared from the vote of the Chief Justice of the United States upon such an occasion? And
if so, does not that fact morally incapacitate him for the proper discharge of his
customary duties? In the very case supposed by Mr. Boutwell of a tie upon a serious point,
is it not more satisfactory that there should be a casting-vote intrusted to an officer
who is beyond suspicion of fear or favor, as in the view of the Constitution the Chief
Justice is? Moreover, if with the view of his position and of his relation to the Senate
as a Court of Impeachment of the President, which any Chief Justice must be supposed to
hold, he should decline to be a mere figure-head, his retirement dissolves the Court, and
there is no remedy but his own impeachment. Yet is it desirable to impeach upon such
grounds? Is it not wiser to allow that as the Constitution brings the Chief Justice into
the Court as President, it brings him with the usual presidential powers?
This was the opinion of the Senate, and
the precedent established will probably remain. But, whether it does or not, we protest
against a kind of hostility toward the Chief Justice which arises from the fact that his
opinion upon this subject differs from that of some of the Senators. Mr. Chase has been a
Senator and is now Chief Justice, and has studied the Constitution as diligently as any
member of the Court of Impeachment. His opinion upon this point is a priori
peculiarly valuable, because he is peculiarly interested in it, and has undoubtedly very
thoroughly examined it. It may be supposed, also, that he has the advantage of the opinion
of his brethren upon the Bench. But there is certainly no reason to suppose that he wishes
for any unworthy purpose to perplex or prolong the proceedings; or that any view which he
may hold of the political expediency of impeachment will more injuriously affect his
conduct than it does that of any of the Presidents counsel. Indeed, we are very
confident that the Chief Justice is not likely, by his part in this trial, to lose any of
that high and honorable consideration which he now enjoys.