The point has been plain
from the beginning of the long debate. The substantial question is, shall the President
remove at pleasure? The discussion has been inevitably, but illogically, mingled with the
question of personal confidence in General Grant; for it is simply a question of purity of
administration. The Constitution does not decide it, and when the point was presented in
the early Congress, it was decided against the Senate by a tie vote. Mr. Webster was of
opinion that practice had interpreted the Constitution upon the subject; but that is a
kind of interpretation which may be always challenged.
Mr. Grimes, who is a repealer, said that he wanted to give
President Grant the same chance that every other President had enjoyed. But he did not
stay to suggest why the law was passed. The reason of the passage of the law was, that
experience had proved that it might be dangerous to the country that the President should
enjoy that chance. It is no answer to say that President Grant could be trusted and
therefore the law might be repealed. So Mr. Stewart could be trusted as Secretary of the
Treasury; but was Mr. Grimes ready to repeal the law that barred his entrance into the
Treasury Department? Laws are not made upon personal but upon general considerations. The
weakness or the crimes of individuals, indeed, may furnish forcible arguments, but that is
all. The justification of the Tenure bill was not the conduct of Andrew Johnson, but the
peculiar and perilous power lodged with the Executive. If, as General Butler says, the
Tenure bill was leveled at Andrew Johnson alone, and was passed upon no general
considerations whatever, then it ought to be repealed. But if Johnsons conduct was
merely the revelation of a danger to which public attention had not been previously
called, then the repeal should not be carried until the public danger is demonstrated not
to exist. Now the debate which led to the passage of the law did not proceed upon Andrew
Johnsons delinquencies, but upon general and constitutional considerations.
Mr. David of New York, of whose remarks we have seen but a
brief report, said that the Senate could not be held to any responsibility for the
retention of improper persons. Without demanding whether it is practicable to hold the
President to any similar responsibility, it may be asked whether the Senate can be held to
any responsibility for improper appointments? An unfit officer is the fault of the Senate
quite as much as of the Executive; and to suppose that the Senate would insist upon
retaining a dishonest or incompetent officer is to assert that it would confirm him. But
is the power of confirmation to be questioned? If we recur to the Constitution we must
agree that it does not mean to authorize the Executive arbitrarily to make a clean sweep
of the officers to whose appointment the Senate has just consented. Still there was no
defense against such unconstitutional action. Johnson was engaged in precisely that performance. The attention of Congress and the country was called to it? and the
Tenure bill was framed.
The President is by no means the unchecked Executive that
he is sometimes alleged to be. He is not solely responsible for the execution of
the laws, because he has not an uncontrolled authority of appointment. He
must be satisfied with such officers as the Senate approves. The Senate can not, indeed,
fill the offices without his nomination? but neither can he fill them without the approval
of the Senate. Presumptively, therefore, the responsibility is divided. Then the
extent of the division must be determined by experience and grave reflection. But the
obscure bill which has been passed by Congress, so far as it can be interpreted,
authorizes the President to suspend merely, and then subjects even his nominating power to
the will of the Senate. The President, it says, may suspend until the end of the next
session of Congress; but if during that session the Senate refuses to confirm a nomination
to the place he may make another. But how if the Senate does not refuse, and does not
confirm? The suspension lasts to the end of the session, and the Senate has not acted. Is
the office then vacant, or is the suspended officer restored? We defy any body to
determine from the bill. General Butler says loudly, that of course the office is vacant.
But General Butler is not the bill.
It is simply unpardonable that a law so important should
be so obscure. It was not a question of skillful overreaching between the Senate and the
House, but of the highest public welfare. If the House had had the firmness to insist upon
understanding what it was doing, and the resolution to teach General Butler that the
interest of the country and not his will was to determine its action, this absurd result
would have been avoided. It is a settlement that settles nothing, and that will return to
plague those who connived at it.