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HarpWeek Commentary: In
addition to the rupture with Congress, Johnson lost the services of three cabinet members
who disagreed with him. James Speed resigned as Attorney General as mentioned in paragraph
2; James Harlan resigned as Secretary of the Interior and William Dennison as Postmaster
General. Only Secretary of State William H. Seward, who supported Johnson, and Secretary
of War Edwin M. Stanton, who disapproved of his policies, remained from his original
cabinet in August 1866. Four members of Johnsons original Cabinet (appointed by President Lincoln) remained by
August 1866. Three of them supported Johnsons policies? Secretary of State William
H. Seward, Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles and Secretary of the Treasury Hugh
McCulloch? and one key member, Secretary
of War Edwin M. Stanton, opposed them. Stantons opposition played a key role in
Johnsons impeachment. |
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The Case Stated
The rupture between the President and Congress is
lamentable, but it is decided. As his policy failed to command the approval of the Union
party, and it can not be denied that it has, his only alternative was to relinquish it or
to await other support. That could come from one quarter only, from the Democratic party.
It was not to be expected that the President would relinquish what he deemed the sole
constitutional and sagacious policy; and therefore the elected candidate of the Union
party of 1864 has no other party support than that of the Democracy.
Regrets and
recriminations are equally vain. It is too late to wonder whether, had the wise and
patient Lincoln lived, the party which sustained him and the war would not have settled
without serious apposition the great question of reunion. It is vain also to blame the
President or to asperse him. Men act from mixed motives, and it is both unmanly and unwise
to traduce those with whom we profoundly differ, and whom we most steadfastly oppose. The
welfare of the country, through the triumph of the fundamental American principle, which
Mr. Speed well defines in his letter of resignation as "the political liberty and
equality of mankind under the law,"* this is the end which every thoughtful citizen
will constantly bear in mind, and it is therefore of very little importance whether the
President is influenced by the desire of re-election; by the wish to live his future years
peacefully in Tennessee; by an ineradicable "Southern" proclivity; by an
inextinguishable hostility to what is called "Radicalism;" by incapacity to
comprehend the situation, or by the most conscientious desire to do his duty faithfully.
It is vain to turn upon him the fire of his own words when he was military Governor of
Tennessee, or when he succeeded to the Presidency; for a man of ardent temperament and of
utterly undisciplined mind says many things under extraordinary excitement for which he
can not fairly be held responsible. Whatever the Presidents motives may be, he has
distinctly declared his policy. That policy will be sustained by the Democratic party, and
must be estimated not by his personal character, but by its own merits and by the
necessities of action which the new coalition will impose upon him.
This is true also of the policy of
Congress. Our judgment must be determined not by our opinion of Mr. Thaddeus Stevens, or
of Mr. Ingersoll, or of any other ardent or unwise declaimer; not by the ill-humor of
debates, or by the occasional folly of certain acts. Neither is it of present importance
whether Congress has been too slow or too fast in arriving at its conclusions. Congress
has been maligned, derided, and denounced as the President has been. It is enough that
each has declared its policy of reunion. Upon those policies the country will decide at
the autumn elections; and every sensible man will weigh them well
The exact point, then, is this: The
President holds that the States lately in rebellion, having accepted certain conditions
which he has imposed without consultation with representatives of the people, have now the
right to be admitted to Congress upon the same terms as the other States. Congress holds
that the Legislative and not the Executive department of the Government is the rightful
judge of the situation, and that the public safety requires another condition as the
necessary complement of those already accepted, and opposes admitting any late insurgent
State to an equal share in the Government until it adopts the amendment proportioning
representation to voters, and excluding from office at the pleasure of Congress certain
conspicuous offenders. The object of this amendment is of vital importance. To state it is
to prove it; for it proposes merely that no State which has tried to destroy the
Government shall, as a result of its abortive effort, gain increased power in the
Government.
There is thus no difference of principle
between the President and Congress, although there is that difference between him and the
Democratic party which denies the right to impose any conditions whatever. But the
President has done it. It was the necessity of the case, and he could not help it. Either
South Carolina had the right to demand to resume her old share in the Government without
accepting the Emancipation Amendment, or revoking her act of secession, or repudiating her
rebel debt, or she has no right to demand it until she has satisfied any other condition
which the Government may require for the same purpose of security to the Union. The
President, indeed, claims that his conditions are the only constitutional terms that can
be asked. But that is merely his opinion. Nobody denies that every State enjoying equal
rights in the Union is entitled to representation. But the very issue is, when and upon
what terms a State which has just failed in a conspiracy to destroy the Union may safely
resume its equality of rights within it. The President insists that his terms re a
sufficient security. Congress insists that something more is necessary to make them
secure. The country will decide between them.
We believe that Congress will be
overwhelmingly supported; we do not doubt that the country feels its proposition to be
wiser, and know that the renewed ascendancy of the Democratic party would be an
incalculable disaster. It is neither extravagant, nor unfriendly, nor dangerous, nor
impolitic, to insist that no State engaged in the late rebellion shall resume its national
relations until care is taken that it shall not have gained political power by the
rebellion. If any such State refuse to accede to a condition so intrinsically just and so
unprecedently moderate, can it fairly accuse the loyal Union men of the country of
wickedly excluding it from Congress and dangerously delaying reunion? The almost universal
testimony of the best witnesses of the condition of the late insurgent section - the tone
of its leading and popular newspapers and addresses - the evidence of conspicuous
insurgent leaders before Congress - their frank, private avowals and conduct, and the
result of the local elections, all show that the hostitlity to the Union, in which the
Southern citizens of this generation were bred, has not - and it is not surprising that it
has not - been torn out of them by a terrible war which has devastated their homes and
ruined their properties. Justice, policy, humanity, every wise and generous consideration,
demand that they be not, therefore, harshly repelled and denied the fellowship of the
Union. But the same conclusive reasons certainly require that they shall not have gained
increased power in the Union. They and their purposes and policy are not new to the
country. They are devoted, wily, audacious. A great party stands ready organized and eager
to act with them. They are, indeed, for the moment prostrate, but they are not powerless;
and as the Union takes them into its bosom again to renew their life, it is not unkind nor
unwise if it seeks to guard against their sting.
Articles Relating to Johnson's First Vetoes:
A Long Step
Forward
January 27, 1866, page 50
Congress
February 10, 1866, page 83
Education of the
Freedmen
February 10, 1866, page 83
The Veto Message
March 3, 1866, page 130
The Freedmens
Bureau
March 10, 1866, page 146
The Presidents Speech
March 10, 1866, page 147
The Political
Situation
April 14, 1866, page 226
The Civil Rights
Bill
April 14, 1866, page 226
The Civil Rights
Bill
April 21, 1866, page 243
The Congressional
Plan of Reorganization
May 12, 1866, page 290
The Trial of the
Government
May 26, 1866, page 322
Making Treason
Odious
June 2, 1866, page 338
The Final Report of
the Reconstruction Committee
June 23, 1866, page 387
The Report of the
Congressional Committee
June 23, 1866, page 386
The Case Stated
August 4, 1866, page 482
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